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High Seas Intervention: Parameters
of Unilateral Action'
By R. PALMER CUNDICK**O
I. INTRODUCTION
We find the law of the sea burgeoning in an era of unprecedented
legal conflict. Nations are claiming more ocean resources for
themselves. Nationalism has nurtured extremism, clouding even
legitimate claims with suspicion. Historic rights have been spuri-
ously denounced. Emerging claims are prolific, and prolifically
unreasonable. Concessions, for the most part, have been few,
unrealistic, and unproductive toward lasting solutions. Tn short,
the public order of the oceans is being vigorously challenged,
vital interests are at issue, and the direction taken in the next few
years may well reshape the law of the sea that will govern for
decades to come.
* The opinions and views herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Judge Advocate General, Department
of the Army, or any other agency of the United States Government.
** B.S., 1963, J.D., 1965 University of Utah; LL.M.-Public International
Law & Comparative Law, 1970, George Washington University; Major,
U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps; currently serving as member
of the Department of Defense Advisory Group on Law of the Sea and
Chief, Foreign Law Team, International Affairs Division, Office of the
Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army; member of bars of
the U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. Court of Military Appeals, and the States
of Utah and California.
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The claim to intervene is but one facet of the emerging claims
which must be resolved. It offers, however, a uniquely limited
context in which to appraise many of the relevant policies and val-
ues at issue in the larger arena. Moreover, it permits evaluation
of principles governing accommodations of new and conflicting
ocean uses and a means of testing the lawfulness of surging uni-
lateral claims in support of such uses.
It is well established that international law prohibits any state
from subjecting any part of the high seas to its exclusive control,
or from interfering with the exercise of freedom of navigation by
ships sailing on the high seas under the flag of another state. Yet,
what happens when a supertanker is damaged and empties its oil
into the high seas? Must a coastal state stand helplessly by while
that oil, pushed by the wind, currents and tides, turns into an
agent of death and destruction as it flows toward its shores? To
answer this we must analyze the claim of a state to act on the
high seas against a foreign vessel which, following a maritime
casualty, threatens its coastal interests with pollution by oil, and
to take necessary measures to prevent or mitigate such pollution.1
Action pursuant to this claim has been labeled "intervention" by
the 1969 Intervention Convention Relating to Intervention on the
High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties2 (hereinafter, Inter-
vention Convention). Nevertheless, unqualified characterization
of the action as intervention may be misleading because it norm-
ally implies some interference against the personality of a state or
some threat to its territorial integrity.3 For our purposes, the
term has little vestige of its traditional usage and is limited exclu-
sively to describe action taken against a vessel to prevent or miti-
1. The claim of competence to intervene to prevent oil pollution con-
flicts with freedom of navigation on the high seas and is unlawful unless
it can be justified as a limited exception. For a discussion of limited
exceptions to freedom on the high seas, see M. MCDOuGAL & W. BURKE,
THE PuBvic ORDEa or THE OcEANs, Ch. 6 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
McDOUGAL & Bum]E).
2. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, done at Brussels Nov. 29, 1969, re-
produced in 9 INT'L LEGAL M ATERALs 25 (1970); 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 271
(1970); 1 T. MAR. L. & Com. 367 (1970); LAY, CHURCmm L & NORDQtJIST, 2 NEW
DnmcTnvEs n THE LAW OF THE SEA 592 (1973); [hereinafter cited as Inter-
vention Convention].
3. See United Nations Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention,
G. Res. 2131, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 11, 12, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
gate damage to coastal interests, unaccompanied by a threat to
the internal or external affairs of the flag state.
Even in this limited context, the term "intervention" connotes
forceful interference, possible violence and destruction of property,
the exercise of power against another's will. No less unpleasant is
the term 'pollution." It connotes contamination, destruction, suf-
fering, possibly death. When a major oil spill occurs on the high
seas, it brings these two negative concepts into direct opposition.
So long as oil continues to be of vital economic importance, na-
tions will protect their right to transport it across the world's
oceans. Moreover, with oil's strategic value to national defense,
it is obvious that interference with its movement may not be
viewed lightly. On the side of an intervening state, however, is the
public clamor for protection from oil spills. The past half-decade
has recorded an impressive list of major tanker disasters which
have caused far-reaching damage to coastal interests.4 In 1966 the
Anne Mildred Brovig spilled oil into the North Sea off the coast of
Germany.5 The Torrey Canyon disaster struck Great Britain and
France in 1967.6 Just a year later, the United States had its first
major encounter with oil pollution in San Juan Harbor, Peurto
Rico, from the Ocean Eagle.7 The World Glory8 polluted the
4. For a study of major incidents of marine pollution by oil over the
period 1959-1969, see IMCO, International Legal Conference on Marine
Pollution Damage, Brussels, Nov. 29, 1969, Note by Secretariat on "Descrip-
tions of Major Incidents of Marine Pollution by Oil," IMCO Doc. LEG/
CONF/6 (Oct. 13, 1969). For listings of major oil spills, see also Hearings
on S. 7 & S. 544 Before Subcomm. on Air & Water Pollution of the Sen.
Public Works Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 91-2 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as 1969 Hearings].
A 1200-foot tanker of 300,000 tons displacement is 3 % times the dis-
placement of America's largest aircraft carrier. "These new tankers are
so seriously underpowered they're dangerously difficult to maneuver: the
stopping distance of a mammoth tanker from an initial speed of only 12
knots with its propeller rotating full astern is more than a mile and a
half. Thirty-thousand installed horsepower in a 1,200-foot tanker is the
equivalent of about one-third horsepower." 'Wash. Post, Mar. 1, 1971, § B,
at 6, col. 7.
5. The Norwegian tanker, Anne Mildred Brovig, collided with the
British vessel Pentland. After grounding, the hull broke in two, spilling
125,000 barrels of oil into the North Sea off the Coast of Germany. Two
and one-half months were required for the cleanup at a reported cost of
$241,000. IMCO Doc. LEG/CONF/6, (Annex II), supra note 4, at 20.
6. IMCO Doc LEG/CONF/6 (Annex II), supra note 4, at 20.
7. In 1968, the Ocean Eagle grounded and broke up while entering the
harbor at San Juan, Puerto Rico, contaminating the beach area for 16 miles
and the entire harbor. Two months were required for the cleanup at a
cost of $2.5 million. Hearings on H.R. 15906 and related bills Before
Subcomm. on Rivers & Harbors of the House Comm. on Public Works,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 90-28 at 296-307 (1968); Cerames-Vivas, Special
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coast of South Africa three months later. 1969 found Canada con-
tending with the Arrow off Nova Scotia.9 Heavy fog lifted
from a black sludge in San Francisco Bay in January 1971, after the
Arizona Standard collided with the Oregon Standard.0 South
Africa bombed the Wafra in March to ease its second major disas-
ter in less than three years.": Significantly, more than half of these
tanker disasters occurred on the high seas.
Should the potential for harm by the otherwise socially bene-
ficial act of shipping oil become justification for subjecting dis-
tressed tankers to national claims of intervention. Or, is a flag
state immune under all circumstances from submission of her
vessels to such claims? Will failure to acknowledge a right of in-
tervention prevent a response by a threatened coastal state? As-
suming it will not, will denial of the right threaten world peace?
The challenge to the public order of the oceans clearly exists.
It is the task of international law to appraise the respective claims
and counterclaims and to resolve them in a manner which will
avert or minimize this threat.
II. INTERVENTION TRENDs
With the accelerated number of significant oil spills, the need
for effective legal procedures has prompted both unilateral and
Report to Office of Naval Research Oceanic Biology Programs on the Ocean
Eagle Oil Spill, in 1969 Hearings, supra note 4, at 426.
8. The World Glory broke in two during a severe storm off the coast of
South Africa spilling 332,000 barrels of crude oil. Approximately 20 days
were required for the cleanup at a cost of $420,000. George Washington
Univ., Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, Legal, Econ-
omic and Technical Aspects of Liability and Financial Responsibility as
Related to Oil Pollution 15-12 (draft Dec. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Oil
Pollution Study]. South Africa also had major spills in 1968 from the
Esso Essen and the Andron, costing nearly a half-million dollars in cleanup
costs. 1969 Hearings, supra note 4, at 1318.
9. Hearings on Ex. G, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Before Subcomm. on Oceans
& Int'l Environment of the Sen. Foreign Relations Comm., 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., at 64 (1971).
10. The two Standard Oil (California) tankers collided in dense fog un-
der Golden Gate Bridge and drifted helplessly into San Francisco Bay
spilling oil which coated beaches and wildlife sanctuaries for 50 miles
along the coast. Oil on Troubled Waters, Tnv, Feb. 1, 1971, at 61. Wash.
Post, Jan. 19, 1971, § A, at 1, col. 1. Five days after the Arizona accident,
the Esso Gettysburg hit the rocks at the mouth of New Haven harbor,
spreading 386,000 gallons of oil over three miles of Long Island Sound.
Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 1971, § A, at 6, col. 1.
11. Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1971, § C, at 3, col. 3.
multilateral action by coastal states. Among those states acting
unilaterally.are the U.S., Canada, and Great Britain. In 1970 Con-
gress empowered the U.S. to summarily remove or destroy a pol-
luting vessel so long as it was within the territorial sea.12 (Legis-
lation to implement the Intervention Convention which would ex-
tend this authority to the high seas is now pending.) Thereafter,
Canada authorized similar action anywhere in the Arctic Waters,18
in certain fishing zones on the high seas' 4 and anywhere within its
newly claimed 12-mile territorial sea.15 In 1971 Great Britain for-
mally extended its authority outside U. K. territorial waters,16 and
reaffirmed that extension in subsequent legislation.' 7
The most significant acts of intervention have come in the ab-
sence of domestic legislation. Foremost have been the bombings
of the Torrey Canyon in 1967 by Great Britain and of the Wafra in
1970 by South Africa. The former incident was the primary moti-
vation not only for domestic legislation, but for the Intervention
Convention concluded two years later in Brussels.
The Intervention Convention is, of course, the first major mul-
tilateral effort in this area, and its signing preceded the afore-
mentioned domestic legislation, although Canada is not a signatory.
It is largely the product of the Inter-Governmental maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO), a specialized agency of the
United Nations. Article I provides:
1. Parties to the present Convention may take such measures on
the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or elimi-
12. Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 93-94 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WQIA].
13. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c.47 (Can.
1970), reproduced in 9 INT'L LEG. MATERiALs 543 (1970).
14. An Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act, 18-19
Eliz. 2, c. 68 (Can. 1970).
15. Id.
16. The Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1971, c. 21 (Eng.), conferred cer-
tain intervention powers on the government and permitted it, by Order
in Council, to extend such powers to the high seas. That extension was
made effective on Nov. 22, 1971, by the Oil in Navigable Waters (Shipping
Casualties) Order 1971.
While the legislation was being passed, British authorities stood idly
by as tug captains from several countries wrangled over salvage rights
over the crippled Liberian tanker Panther which grounded for 5 days off
the coast of England, discharging 25,000 tons of crude oil into the sea just
outside Britain's three-mile territorial waters. The new legislation was
designed to avoid a repetition of such incidents. JouRNAL oF Coanvnmcs,
Apr. 9, 1971.
17. The Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971, c. 21 (Eng.), repealed the
Oil in Navigable Waters Act. It contains substantially the same provi-
sions for intervention, and, under the Savings Clause, retains the Order in
Council extending them to the high seas.
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nate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related inter-
ests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil, following
upon a maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which
may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful conse-
quences.
2. However, no measures shall be taken under the present Con-
vention against any warship or other ship owned or operated by
a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-com-
mercial service.' 8
The Convention permits action on the high seas without limita-
tion as to distance and makes no provision for intervention in pol-
lution casualties other than oil-carrying vessels. It is essentially
remedial rather than preventive because action is permitted only
after an accident has occurred. Although the United States and
Great Britain have both ratified the Convention, it is not yet in
force.19
III. CLAIMAN rs, CLAIMS AND OBJECTIVES
An act of intervention affects many parties and interests. Iden-
tifying who participates in the process of claim and decision, their
objectives, who and what is affected, and their claims and counter-
claims permits a more meaningful appraisal. 20 By grouping the
18. For a good overview of the conventions, see O'Connell, Reflections
on Brussels: IMCO and the 1969 Pollution Conventions, 3 ComiELL INT'L
L.J. 162 (1970). Also see D. Pharand, International Regulation and Con-
trol of Oil Pollution tf the High Seas, with Special Reference to the Arctic,
5 WoRLD L. Ray. 93, 97 (1972).
19. The Intervention Convention enters into force 90 days after 15
states have either signed it without reservation as to ratification, accept-
ance or approval or have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance
or approval or accession. On January 12, 1971, the United Kingdom be-
came the first nation to ratify the Convention. The United States rati-
fied it on October 14, 1971, but has not formally deposited an instrument
to that effect, pending implementing legislation. To date, 10 countries
have become Parties, as follows: Ratification deposited: Belgium, France,
Japan, Sweden, United Kingdom; Accession deposited: Senegal, Norway,
Fiji, Liberia; Signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance
or approval: Denmark. For list of signatories, see 9 INT'L LEGAL MA-
TERIALs 25, 45 (1970).
20. In the Torrey Canyon incident, e.g., the vessel was registered under
a Liberian flag and owned by a Bermuda company, which was a sub-
sidiary of a United States corporation. The crew was Greek and the
vessel was on charter to a British Company. The accident occurred on
the high seas and pollution damage was suffered by Great Britain and
France. See Neuman, Oil in Troubled Waters: The International Control
of Marine Pollution, 2 J. MAR. L. & Com. 349, 352 (1971). For an excellent
analysis of a domestic oil pollution problem from the viewpoint of par-
major interests, it is easier to identify how the participants are
aligned:
At least three such intrests, competing for attention and protec-
tion, may be identified: 1) owners of private property, whether
coastal or sea-borne (e.g., oil cargoes); 2) shipping interests (ves-
sel owners, their charterers and their insurers); 3) national inter-
ests in preserving more or less "traditional" law of the sea rights,
particularly freedom of navigation (both merchant and naval). 21
A fourth is the national and international interest in preserving
living resources of the sea. Additionally, there are many deriva-
tive commercial and recreational interests.
Readily identifiable participants which represent these interests
are the maritime and coastal states, the shippers and owners of oil
and vessels, oil-producing states, the United Nations, shipping
organizations, insurance companies, environmentalists, fishermen,
sportsmen, domestic state and local governments, and other di-
verse parties.
The principal claimants which represent these interests are, of
course, the flag state, the coastal state, and the shipper.22  The
coastal state claims a right to intervene to prevent or mitigate pol-
lution, even to remove or destroy the offending vessel, if necessary.
It asserts comprehensive authrity for that specific purpose over
events sufficiently proximate to its shores as to pose a substantial
danger of oil pollution. It seeks to protect its coastlines, including
the living resources of the sea and wealth-producing processes
which are most readily available to its own nationals, as well as
the property interests of its nationals. Moreover, it is not seeking
the usual expansionary objectives associated with extra-territorial
claims, but is acting in a defensive capacity to avert a danger sud-
denly forced upon it.
Under different circumstances a coastal state may find its sit-
uation reversed. As a maritime state, one of its flag vessels may
threaten pollution to another coastal state. Accordingly, its policies
must consider both positions. One view of this dichotomy notes:
The United States has more than one interest. The interest in pre-
serving vast stretches of valuable shoreline is great, while, in
comparison with the rest of the world, its economic interest in its
tanker fleets is small. This would seem to dictate that the real in-
terest lies in stronger coastal state authority.28
ticipants, interests and values, see McDonald, Oil and the Environment:
The View from Maine, FORTuNE, Apr. 1971, at 82.
21. Neuman, supra note 20, at 350.
22. As used herein, the shipper, as claimant, categorically represents the
interests of the owner of the vessel, its charterer, and the owner of the
cargo.
23. E. CowA, Om. Am WATER: THE ToRREY CANYON DISASTER 68 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as CowAN].
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The important point is that even when a state favors coastal au-
thority to intervene, unless it has virtually no maritime fleets or
,seaports of any consequence, it cannot divorce itself from shipping
interests. Therefore, its policies may be expected to extend the
maximum protection possible to shipping and to prevent unwar-
ranted intervention.
The flag state seeks preservation of the right to navigate the
world's oceans free from interference and protection of the prop-
erty rights of owners of vessels sailing under its flag, as well as
the safety and well-being of their crews. It makes a positive de-
mand that it have the exclusive authority to apply policy to its own
vessels, and a negative demand that no other state be authorized
to apply it save in accordance with international law.24 Specifi-
cally, it claims that its vessels on the high seas are immune to any
claim of intervention by a coastal state. Shippers also assert this
claim.
IV. APPRAISAL UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The claim to intervene cannot be addressed without analysis of
the grave consequences attendant to its exercise. A state acts with-
out consent of either the vessel or its flag state (a condition in-
herent in such a claim). Hence, destruction or removal of a vessel
may invite charges of aggression, reprisals, or some measure of re-
ciprocal sanctioning unless the states involved mutually under-
stand the characteristics of the right of intervention and the li-
abilities arising from it.
Does such a right exist in the customary practice of states, or
must it be created by convention? What are the criteria for its ex-
ercise? Are there correlative duties imposed upon the intervening
state? What liabilities, if any, are incurred if a state misjudges a
situation and acts to the detriment of an innocent vessel? How
does the absence or existence of such a right contribute to the peace-
ful public order of the oceans?
These and similar questions should not remain unanswered un-
til a nation intervenes and actually provokes an international mis-
understanding. Present consideration of the claim may prevent
such a misunderstanding and permit focus on the adequacy of the
24. See McDouGAL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 868.
law to deal with the situation so that timely changes and safe-
guards, where necessary, may be instituted. What, then, are the
characteristics of the right?
A. Convention Right.-The view that the right of intervention
must be created by convention looks to traditional approaches as
indicative of the limitations on coastal authority. For example,
the prescription and enforcement of anti-pollution measures have
normally been vested in the vessel's flag state,25 as reflected in
the 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by
Oil. That Convention notes with care that it does not extend the
jurisdiction of any state to deal with such matters. (However, it
does not purport to deal with the problem of intervention, nor
does any other international agreement in force.)
In addressing the draft text of the Intervention Convention, ad-
vocates of this view desired to show that the source of the new au-
thority is the consent of the signatory states and not an inherent
power in the coastal state-a privilege and not a right.26 They ar-
gued that the purpose of the Intervention Convention was to con-
fer on the contracting states certain powers in order to close a
gap in international law. Without the Convention, the argument
continues, the coastal state has no right of intervention outside its
territorial waters; consequently, if it intervenes on the high seas
and thereby causes damage, it does so at its own peril and is liable
for compensation to all parties concerned.2 7
B. Customary Right.-Coastal states have always exerted a mea-
sure of competence upon the adjacent seas to protect their territor-
ial integrity and coastal interests. Yet, to test the exercise of such
competence in terms of "sovereignty" 28 or rights in the "territor-
25. To the extent that claims by the coastal state are recognized, they
are deemed an exercise of concurrent jurisdiction. See Nanda, The "Tor-
rey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENvEm L. J. 400 (1967).
26. See CowAN supra note 23, at 75. For the view of the Liberian dele-
gation that extraordinary privileges were conferred on the coastal state, see
IMCO Dec. LEG/CONF/C.1/SR.18 at 5 (Nov. 24, 1969). The Soviet Union
also mantained that additional rights were being conferred upon coastal
states. IMCO Doc. LEG/CONF/C.1I/SR.5 at 10 (Nov. 14, 1969).
27. The fact that France supported this view is surprising in light of its
experience with the Torrey Canyon. See IMCO Doc. LEG/CONF/C.1/SR.11
at 10 (Nov. 18, 1969).
28. Professors McDougal and Burke prefer not to call this competence
over the high seas "sovereignty."
The simple dichotomy of "sovereignty"-"no sovereignty" is farfrom adequate to describe the complex distribution among
states of inclusive and exclusive competences over the use of the
oceans .... It can only be the grossest overgeneralization to
equate a competence [an occasional competene to prescribe for theprotection of certain particular interests in specified contexts] so
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ial sea" is of minimal help if a state may only exercise sovereign
rights over a zone of water along its shore, upon the legal width
of which there is no universal agreement. 29 Moreover, even if
each state had the exclusive prerogative to define the width of its
territorial sea, the result would be arbitrary and highly unsatis-
factory. Is there, then, a real basis for recognizing such acts as
lawful?
The most convincing basis, but perhaps the most easily abused,
is that a state has an inherent right to protect its territorial integ-
rity. When threatened from its coastal waters, it may protect that
integrity and the interests appurtenant thereto. 30 Thus, it must be
authorized to extend its laws and prescribe and apply policy to
events in those areas which not only affect, but are incompatible
with the preservation of those interests. The test is functional.
Hence, "the distance from shore at which these powers [in contig-
uous zones] may be exercised is determined not by mileage but by
necessity of the littoral state and by the connection between the
interests of its territory and the acts performed on the high sea.
31
circumscribed with that continuing, comprehensive, and arbitrary
competence over resources which is commonly called sovereignty.
McDoUGAL & BunxE, supra note 1, at 610-11.
29. Territorial sea claims vary from 3 to more than 200 miles. Sub-
ject to existing navigation rights already vested in the international com-
munity, and particularly the right of transit through international straits,
there is a growing practice among the majority of states to recognize at
least a 12-mile territorial sea.
30. "The real basis for this jurisdiction and the test of its soundness
from the standpoint of international law is found in the theory of inter-
ests. The facts of life-the needs of nations-must be considered in this
connection." W. A1lASTERSON, Jurisdiction in Marginal Seas 381 (1929).
There is now a right of self-help in the event of the Torrey Can-
yon type of situation .... I do think that the states have an
immediate right to abate dangers of the Torrey Canyon type, on
their borders, provided ... the rule of proportionality is observed.
Proportionality is a rule of reasonableness, applicable both to an
excessive pre-emptive exercise of the freedom of the high seas by
a ship engaged in polluting the ocean and the excessive remedial
or abatement measures of a coastal state. It limits both to doing
no more than is necessary to exercise their rights without harming
others unduly. Goldie, Principles of Responsibility in Interna-
tional Law, Hearings on IMCO Civil Liabilities Conventions (Oil
Pollution) Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (July 21 & 22,
1970), note 44 at 103, hereinafter cited as IMCO Hearings].
31. Research in International Law, Harvard Law School, Nationality,
Responsibility of States, Territorial Waters 334 (1929), cited in McDouGAL
& BUnKE, supra note 1, at 9 n.25.
This principle of protective jurisdiction has never been repudi-
ated.32  On the contrary, it is universally acknowledged that a
state's power to secure itself from injury may be exercised beyond
the limits of its territory.3 3 Real danger of the littoral state, rather
than the location of the action alone, is the test of the right to act.8 4
"A state has a right to protect itself against hostile acts in the wat-
ers adjoining its coasts, regardless of whether such acts occur within
or beyond the limits of its territorial sea."35
Whether the basis for action be called "necessity," "real danger"
or some synonymous term, propinquity, although important, is
relative; the location and intensity of the activity in question and
its unique impact upon the social processes of a particular coastal
state are primary.
One of the interesting aspects of the Intervention Convention
was the manner in which states reaffirmed the existence of a cus-
tomary right of international law to protect themselves from pol-
lution.36 Some delegations observed that the law was uncertain:
The position up till now had been that no real consensus of opin-
ion existed about the rights and liabilities of a State in the event
of a casualty approaching its coast and presenting grave and immi-
nent danger of pollution. The first questions to be settled were
whether the State in those circumstances had the right to destroy
the casualty and whether, if it did so, it might incur liability for
damages. Ideas were uncertain as to the answers in law and the
purpose of the convention under consideration was to remove
those uncertainties.3 7
States voicing these uncertainties advocated a comprehensive
convention which would permit intervention in cases of any pol-
lutants, not only oil. However, it became apparent that too little
was known about substances other than oil to include them in the
Convention. Hence, those opposing a comprehensive convention
argued that
32. Brown, Protective Jurisdiction, 34 Am . J. INz'L L. 114 (1940).
33. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234 (1804).
34. Littoral states may act in certain ways for the preservation of
their safety and the protection of their laws over an undefined
and indefinite stretch of coastal water ... the whole idea of a
peculiar and definite marginal sea tends to be discredited. Real
danger to the littoral state or its laws, and actual infractions of
these laws, are the tests of the right of the state to act, rather
than the scene of that action. P. POTR, THE FREEDOm OF THE
SEAS 103, 104 (1924).
35. SuLtivAN & BuRKE, THE LAW OF THE SEA: OFFSHORE BOUNDARIES AND
ZONES 229 (L. Alexander ed. 1967).
36. Some states, such as Canada, were very dissatisfied with the con-
vention and felt that it would be ineffective because it was merely
declarative of existing rights. See also Neuman, supra note 20, at 353.
37. IMCO Doc. LEG/CONF/C.1/SR.3 at 6 (Nov. 13, 1969) (statement by
the Irish delegate).
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the fact that the Convention made no mention of cases of pollution
on the high seas caused by cargoes other than oil did not mean
that a Coastal State was prevented from taking measures against
such pollution. Although international law upheld the principle
of free navigation on the high seas, coastal states should in extreme
cases be able to take measures to protect themselves.3s (Emphasis
added.)
Conferees finally agreed that by limiting the Convention to oil
they were not abridging any right of a state to protect itself
against pollution by any other agent.3 9 If the right of a state to
protect itself against pollutants other than oil exists apart from con-
vention law, it is difficult to argue that the right to protect against
pollution by oil does not also exist independently.
40
38. This position was expressed by the Netherlands delegate. IMCO
Doc. LEG/CONF/C.1/SR.2 at 4 (Nov. 12, 1969).
39. The effect of the Public Law [Intervention] Convention is to
set out in detail how the right of self-help and abatement in cases
of oil pollution should be exercised. Since it relates only to pollu-
tion by oil, we have to ask ourselves if this convention limits
customary international law? My answer would be in the nega-
tive, because the parties to the convention specifically resolved
that further studies dealing with pollution agents other than oil
would be continued, and that, in the meantime, states would exer-
cise their authority under general international law to deal with
other polluting materials and agents in terms of the procedures
and notification requirements provided in the Public Law Con-
vention. Goldie, supra note 30, at 99.
Since 1969, work has progressed toward a treaty which does relate to
substances other than oil. In its January 1973 meeting, the IMCO Legal
Committee prepared a final Draft Protocol Relating to Intervention on the
High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution Damage by Substances Other
Than Oil. This draft will be submitted by the IMCO Council for ap-
proval to be used as the working draft for the IMCO Marine Pollution
Conference in October 1973. In its operative language, the draft is almost
identical to the 1969 Intervention Convention. Moreover, it expressly
incorporates paragraph 2 of Article I and Articles II to VII of that Conven-
tion, applying them to substances other than oil. It also provides for an
amendable appendix listing specific substances "liable to create hazards
to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage
amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea." Inter-
vention would be permissible in cases involving substances not con-
tained in the appendix but meeting the preceding test. The burden of
proof, however, would be on the intervening state to establish that the
substance did meet such test.
40. "While acceptance of the Convention will not notably advance the
rights of governments in pollution disaster situations, it will at least
codify the existing state of international law on the subject." Mendelsohn,
Maritime Liability for Oil Pollution-Domestic and International Law, 48
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 28 (1969). The U.S. Congressional delegation to the
1967 IMCO session recommended legislative action to empower the Presi-
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If the right does not exist under customary international law,
and the purpose of the Intervention Convention was to create such
a right rather than to define the community expectations as to the
conditions of its exercise, then several acute problems arise. If
the Convention never comes into force, no right is ever created.
If it does, there is no provision for action against a non party state.
Hence, justification for such action relies on the argument that the
Convention has become customary international law. In either case,
barring widespread acceptance of the convention in a relatively
short time frame, an unsatisfactory vacuum exists.
It is the opinion of this writer that the right of intervention is
merely codified and clarified by the Intervention Convention.
1. Criteria for Exercise of the Right
The competence to take unilateral action should only be exer-
cised for the protection of highly important interests. The more
interests of other states which are protected, the less objectionable
the action. Moreover, the authorization of unilateral prescrip-
tion does not imply arbitrary decision, for any exercise of such
authority is subject to review by the rest of the community. The
question then becomes, by what criteria is it judged? Who should
be the decision maker?
The preceding questions were addressed at the Intervention
Convention. A suggested approach was that the coastal state decide
whether it was in danger of being polluted and then intervene
Cas it deems necessary."41 Concern was expressed that this would
change the draft text of "as may be necessary" from an objective
criterion into a subjective one,42 and on this basis the approach was
rejected. It is one thing for a state to exercise its power to in-
tervene; it is quite another for it to be the exclusive judge of the
legality of its action. Any action must, in the final analysis, be
subjected to an objective scrutiny of the international commun-
ity-a test which discourages arbitrary action.
Even agreement that any intervening action must be measured
dent to take emergency action in the event of a casualty threatening the
United States. Of particular interest is the idea that such action would not
violate international law. WATER CONTROL NEws, Sept. 25, 1967, at 1. It was
subsequently advocated that the United States seek "international con-
currence" with the United States' view that nations threatened by spills
on the high seas can take immediate protective measures. SEcRETAiuS Ow
INTERIOR & TRANSPORTATION, A REPORT ON PorLuTIoN OF THE NATIoN's WATERS
BY OmL Am OTHER BAZARnous SusTANcEs, at 25 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Report to the President].
41. EVICO Doc. LEGICONFIC.I/SR.5 at 3 (Nov. 14, 1969).
42, Id. at 5.
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objectively does not, however, specify the conditions or standards
to be objectively applied. The draft text set forth three conditions:
(1) there must be grave and imminent danger to coastal or related
interests; (2) there must be some relationship between the casu-
alty and the damage; (3) there must be catastrophic or major con-
sequences involved. The second condition is implicit in the first,
but a discussion of the first and the third conditions is helpful.
An act of intervention is so serious that it can only be justified
under exceptional circumstances. The acute problem, however,
is not in justifying an act under the most serious circumstances,
but in ascertaining the minimum conditions under which justifi-
cation will lie. As a safeguard, the right must only be exercised
where danger of sufficient magnitude and imminency is involved.
Most states at the Convention agreed that the test requires both
"grave and imminent" danger. Considerable difficulty was en-
countered as delegates attempted to distinguish the consequences
of the danger from the danger itself, and then to define those conse-
quences. They felt that mere danger, without some reference to
its consequences, was insufficient to justify a state in taking action
to protect itself. The original draft text permitted intervention
in the event of "grave and imminent danger" from oil pollution
which might reasonably be expected to result in "catastrophic
or major consequences." That text seemed to imply that interven-
tion was possible only when the damage threatened was virtually
irreparable. A less strict phraseology, "major harmful conse-
quences", was adopted as more advantageous to both coastal and
shipping interests. 43
2. Duties Imposed
It is instructive to examine the duties which arise concommitant
with the exercise of the right of intervention. Foremost is the duty
to preserve living resources. Where intervention would threaten
life or result in greater detriment than the pollution itself, re-
straint is essential. Second is the duty to conserve resources. This
means that the proportionality of response must be no greater than
43. IMCO Doc. LEG/CONF/C.1/SR.6 at 3 (Nov. 17, 1969). The United
States proposed that the words "significant harmful" be substituted for
"major or catastrophic." Id. For the United States' rejection of the
"catastrophic consequences" terminology, see note 41 supra, at 3.
that necessary to prevent or mitigate the pollution. Finally, there
is a duty to make adequate compensation or restitution where
either of the preceding duties has been breached.44
The context of the right of intervention contemplates a mari-
time casualty which may or may not result from negligence, but
which presumably is not a result of intentional misconduct. The
casualty itself may result in injury or loss of life. Therefore, any
aggravation of such injury or loss of life by an act of intervention
can be but poorly rationalized. To the contrary, a state contem-
plating intervention has an affirmative duty to render assistance
and expedite the safety of passengers or crew before it acts. Hu-
man life must be valued above all else.
It is conceivable that under some circumstances the threat of pol-
lution may be grave and imminent, but the danger of loss of life
or injury to captain and crew aboard the vessel be less serious. If
under such circumstances it is impossible to effect timely removal
of the vessel and the only alternative is to order its destruction,
what course of action is open to a state in the event that all or a
part of the crew elect to remain on board and refuse to evacuate the
vessel? A captain, for example, might refuse to leave his vessel
until the state contracts to pay for its loss and that of its re-
maining cargo. He might go a step further and require that the
state idenmify the owners against all pollution damages and costs
of cleanup in excess of their insured liability.
In such a case, the duty to protect life must not be permitted to
be turned against a state and used as a means whereby an offend-
ing party may evade the consequences of its action. Promises or
agreements exacted under such coercive conditions must be void
as against public policy.
The duty to preserve life does not stop with human life. A state
must equally take into account the likelihood of other damage
which its intervening measures might cause. The cure must not
be more deadly than the cause. Clean beaches are not more import-
ant than living resources. The decision as to means of containing,
dispersing or destroying the oil is an integral part of the decision
to intervene. Where the method of intervention poses greater
44. On the issue of liability ... customary international law has
always held that a state cannot be viewed as acting at its peril.
.... One can argue, however, that even in pre-World War II
international case law, the Trail Smelter arbitration, and after it
the Corfu Channel judgment and the Lac Lanoux arbitral award
all illustrate the development of negligence without fault. IMCO
Hearings, supra note 30, at 100.
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threat to living resources than the oil itself, it cannot be sanc-
tioned.4
5
One of the fundamental safeguards which shipping interests
may look to for a restraint on state action is the principle of "pro-
portionality of response." Essentially, this means that a state must
not use excessive force to achieve its objectives.4" Thus, at a min-
imum, a state must weigh the extent of damage if it does not inter-
vene, the extent to which damage can be averted or minimized
if it does intervene, the availability of alternative measures, and
the damage likely to result from whatever action it might take.47
Not all damages can be assessed in pecuniary terms, but such
terms at least serve as a means of comparison. Should a ship
valued at $20 million be damaged or destroyed to prevent $1 mil-
lion of damage to coastal interests?48 What about damages of $5
million? In each situation a state must determine whether there is
an alternative to destruction which will still accord it a reasonable
measure of protection. For example, it might be possible to order
removal of the oil by pumping it to other vessels or to coastal fa-
cilities, rather than destroy the vessel.
An intervening state has a duty to conserve material resources.
This requires it to find and use other alternatives which are rea-
sonably available. It is impossible to state categorically how
practical or ingenious such alternatives must be to preclude de-
45. It is alleged that the bombing of the Torrey Canyon merely re-
leased greater quantities of oil into the sea, thereby causing more damage.
CowAN, supra note 23, at 199.
46. Article V of the Intervention Convention provides that the cri-
teria of proportionate response are:
(a) the extent and probability of imminent damage if those
measures are not taken; and(b) the likelihood of those measures being effective; and(c) the extent of the damage which may be caused by such
measures.
47. Article V does not implicitly mention consideration of alternative
courses of action as a factor in testing the proportionality of a state's ac-
tion.
48. The Canadian view was that "There obviously would be damage to
the ship, but the coastal State would not be expected to weigh that up
when taking action to combat pollution in the best interest of the largest
number of people in the world." IMCO Doc. LEG/CONF/C.1/SR.11 at 6
(Nov. 18, 1969). The better approach would seem to require consideration
of the damage to the ship along with the other factors affecting the de-
cision.
struction of the vessel. However, a state normally has much
greater resources at its command to find other alternatives than
does a distressed vessel. Consequently, it must discharge this duty
with diligence.
It is fair to assume that any maritime casualty of the magnitude
to cause consideration of intervention will be scrutinized most care-
fully by other states. There is a substantial risk of misjudging
the situation. Measures taken might well be seriously questioned
afterwards, especially when information not available at the time
the action was taken comes to light. Opinions may differ when the
flag state or its nationals afterwards review what has been done
by the coastal state. Therefore, how may an intervening state as-
sure that its actions will stand the scrutiny of the international
community? It must discharge its duty to make inquiry into all
the facts, circumstances and alternatives which the exigency of
the situation will permit. If information is reasonably available
which would preclude intervention, and the state has the oppor-
tunity to make inquiry but does not do so, that neglect militates-
against the legality of its action. Conversely, if a state makes dili-
gent inquiry and fails to obtain existing information which later
comes to light, it is difficult to appraise its action other than on
the basis of the information in its possession at the time the deci-
sion was made.
The affirmative duty to make inquiry to obtain such information
as is reasonably available will encourage a state to gather its facts.
The assurance that, once having done so and after having taken
action reasonably justified on the basis of such facts, it will not be
judged in light of subsequent information operates as a positive
inducement to rational decision making. This works in the best
interests of all participants since the more information available
on which a state may act, the less likelihood there is for value de-
privations in violation of international law.
The duty to inquire has yet another aspect. Oil spills present
technical as well as legal problems. Because technology is in flux,
a coastal state has an affirmative duty to be abreast of current an-
ti-pollution technology and to be "technologically prepared" in the
event of a spill. If it is not, and seeks to intervene under circum-
stances which do not warrant intervention under existing technol-
ogy of other states, it may well be that it has forfeited its right.
A coastal state properly invoking a right of intervention should
not be compelled to compensate for damage or destruction occa-
sioned to the vessel by its act. Where a casualty occurs without the
negligence of the vessel, the question is one of allocating the burden
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of loss between two innocent parties. It may be arbitrary to place
the loss on the vessel so long as the shipping of oil is deemed bene-
ficial to states. However, the vessel undertakes its voyage conson-
ant with the perils of the oceans. Its value is known and can be
protected by insurance. By contrast, a coastal state has no way of
predicting what vessels will become casualties off its shores and
usually must bear its own costs of intervention. Moreover, the un-
measured and uncompensated damages resulting from that portion
of the oil which is not abated will in the long run also be borne by
the coastal state.
A separate situation arises where one party is not innocent, as
when a state acts for purposes other than to abate pollution, or
uses excessive force. 49 Such a situation requires that the injured
party be compensated. 50 However, where the intervention is jus-
tified, but the force employed excessive, compensation should be
required only to the extent of the damage caused by excessive
force.51
3. Justification for Action on the High Seas
The problem of whether to distinguish between action in the
territorial sea and that on the high seas turns on the reasonableness
of a state in appraising what action it should take in terms of ar-
bitrary boundaries rather than in terms of actual danger to its in-
terests. Oil pollution is unique in that the chief damage is not to
49. For the view that political motives, prestige and passion may be
involved, see Y. Dinstein, Oil Pollution by Ships and Freedom of the High
Seas, 3 J. MAR. L. & CoM., 363 at 372 (1972). Dinstein harbors deep mis-
trust of the intervention route and would require an international panel
or flag state to assent to any sinking of a vessel.
50. The Norwegian view was that "it was a general principle of inter-
national law that a State which exceeded its powers should pay compen-
sation." IMCO LEG/CONF/C.1/SR.17 at 8 (Nov. 19, 1969). Greece felt
that a coastal state should have to pay compensation for excessive ac-
tion even in its own territorial waters. See note 37 supra, at 18. Liberia
said that compensation for excessive action was at the heart of the
Convention and "a duty was imposed on the coastal State and that duty
should not lightly be attenuated." IMCO Doc. LEG/CONF/C.1/SR.18
at 5 (Nov. 24, 1969). The latter view is not surprising since most of the
tankers involved with the intervention problem have flown the Liberian
flag.
51. The United States desired that an intervening state be liable only
for that portion of its action which was in excess of the action permitted
under the Convention. See Article VI of the Convention.
the place where the casualty occurs, but to the coasts where the oil
is carried by wind, and waves. For this reason it is obvious that to
deal effectively with the danger it is not practicable to differen-
tiate between the high seas and the territorial sea.
In its territorial sea, a state enjoys the rights of sovereignty with
relatively few limitations. One recognized limitation, however, is
that it must not interfere with the non-prejudicial passage of for-
eign vessels. If it does, justification must be founded on some
principle of international law which is accorded greater priority.
Security or self-protection might be such a principle.
Implicit in the concept of freedom of navigation as applied in ter-
ritorial seas is that there is no prejudice to the peace, good order
or security of coastal interests by a traversing vessel. Therefore,
a vessel exercising this right is deemed free from juridical claims
and unwarranted interference. However, if it substantially threat-
ens coastal interests or violates a state's laws, it thereby abuses
its right, forfeits it, and becomes subject to coastal sanctions.
Where a vessel in the territorial sea discharges immense quan-
tities of oil, there seems little doubt that the coastal state could
lawfully intervene. Is the basis for such action an inherent right?
If so, is it an inherent right to extend its sovereignty beyond na-
tional boundaries? Or is the inherent right one to prescribe and
apply only such policy as is necessary to reasonably protect its le-
gitimate interests?
If the former is true and there is neither the requirement of a
rational interest to be protected, nor of a casual relationship be-
tween the action taken and the interest sought to be protected, the
competence to apply jurisdiction becomes arbitrary-and danger-
ous. The wider the territorial sea claimed, the greater the chance
of arbitrariness. Moreover, if a nation were not accountable for
action taken within its territorial sea, it would only need to extend
it to justify any action it desires to take.
Fortunately, it is not a state's inherent right to prescribe and
apply arbitrary policy beyond its shores. Rather, its right to act
within its territorial sea has evolved primarily because the activi-
ties regulated therein, at least where a narrow width is claimed,
have normally had a substantial causal relationship to, and impact
on, its coastal interests and territorial integrity. In similar fashion,
a limited right to regulate activities outside a state's territorial sea
can be established. Moreover, in view of the extreme differences
in widths of territorial seas claimed by various nations today, it
seems confusing at best to suggest that claims be appraised solely
on an arbitrary differentiation between territorial and high seas.
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There is little equity, for example, in a situation where one state,
having taken excessive action on the high seas. would be account-
able whereas a second state having an extensive territorial sea
could, under similar circumstances, hide under its sovereign
cloak.
Whatever the precise location of the offending vessel in relation
to the boundary of the territorial sea, the danger to the coastal
state remains constant. If protection is needed, the need is un-
changed by the vessel being inside or outside its territorial sea.
Given circumstances of a catastrophic nature, it is unrealistic to as-
sume that most states will not act. If a fundamental principle of
international law comparable to self-protection is not recognized
as a basis to intervene, then a likely alternative is for a state to
attempt to extend its territorial sea to justify future action which
might otherwise fall outside its sea. Such action can hardly be in
the best long-range interests of either that state or the community
of states.
The United States is particularly sensitive to the resolution of
problems by an extension of territorial waters. Yet, it recognizes
that oil spills occuring outside its own three-mile limit can affect
its coasts severely. The obvious temptation is to recognize the
twelve-mile territorial sea concept now finding growing accept-
ance. But in view of the existing conflicts with other states involv-
ing expansive unilateral claims to sovereignty up to as far as 200
miles, it would be shortsighted to seek to solve this limited problem
by a unilateral expansion of its interests.
A preferred alternative is to look to some source of positive in-
ternational law as authority to regulate activities on the high seas.
Article 24 of the Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contigu-
ous Zone of 1958, for example, permits a coastal state to exercise the
control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary regulations within its territorial sea and
in a zone of the high seas contiguous thereto for a distance of
twelve miles from its shores.52 The contiguous zone alternative
recognizes the need for a pragmatic approach to regulating oil
spills which permits action in an area already sanctioned by inter-
52. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at
Geneva, April 29, 1958, in force for the United States Sept. 30, 1964, 15
U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
national convention. To accomplish this, however, it assumes that
reacting to oil spills falls within the purview of "sanitary regula-
tions."
Does the discharge of oil into the contiguous zone, extending an ad-
ditional nine miles beyond the territorial sea, constitute an in-
fringement of sanitary regulations "within its territory?" To an-
swer a question with a question: "Where did the accident occur?"
Traditional law as well as logic would seem to support an argu-
ment that the place of the accident is the place where the impact
is felt. If this is true, then at least those spills creating injury
within the territorial seas could be reached by the enforcement
power of the United States.5 3
If the foregoing is true, and Article 24 is the only juridical basis
on which action can be taken, a state is still left helpless when the
activity to be regulated is more than twelve miles off its shores, as
was the Torrey Canyon.
Whether or not there is authority to regulate oil spills as a "sani-
tary measure" is debatable. Intervention as a means of regulation
in this context is extremely tenuous. Moreover, if customs, fiscal,
immigration and sanitary activities are the only four recognized ac-
tivities which may be regulated on the high seas, and a fifth activity
seriously threatens a coastal state, it must stand helplessly by or
act in contravention of international law. 4
To so limit the activites which may be lawfully regulated is to
lose sight of the purpose of recognizing authority to regulate any
activity in the first instance. If there is a recognized interest to be
protected, there must be a means of protecting it without forcing
states to make tenuous, perhaps unacceptable arguments to justify
actions under international convention, or to choose between ex-
tending their territorial waters and taking action, or permitting
injury to their coastlines. There is a legitimate need to permit
intervention, with all its attendant duties and responsibilities, at
the source of injury-the locus of the vessel. The criteria by which
intervention is permissible should be the same wherever compe-
tence is applied because the coastal interests and the right of navi-
gation at issue are substantially the same whether the vessel is in
the territorial sea or on the high seas. Accordingly, competence to
act on the high seas is not only lawful in this context, but consistent
with the principles on which action within the territorial sea is
juridically based.
53. Clingan, Oil Pollution: No Solution? 95 U.S. NAVAL INsT. Psoc.,
May 1969, at 79.
54. On the need for a precise agreement for coastal rights, see Clin-
gan, supra note 53, at 72. For rejection of the need for an exhaustive
enumeration of related interests for which a state might intervene to pro-
tect itself, see IMCO Doc. LEG/CONF/C.1/SR.7 at 12 (Nov. 15, 1969).
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C. Test of Reasonableness.-The concept of freedom of the seas is
the result of balancing competing claims in their context of reason-
ableness. The test asks what, considering all relevant policies and
all variables in context, is reasonable between the parties.55 The
determination of what is reasonable in a particular controversy re-
quies both (1) an authoritative decision maker, which in cus-
tomary international law is the community of states, and (2) deci-
sion by community or objective criteria. A state may not unilat-
erally decide what is reasonable with respect to its exclusive claims,
for it is not the unilateral claim, but the acceptance by other states
which creates some uniformity of expectations in the international
arena.
The validity of a competing claim is considerably strengthened
when its basis has some historical context. When freedom of nav-
igation is threatened, we may ask whether the threat is from pro-
tecting an interest, other than navigation, which has been tradi-
tionally recognized. The intervention claim finds cognizance in
this context because self-protection is one such interest. The mere
existence of a competing interest traditionally recognized does not,
of itself, however, support a claim. Relevancy to the coastal inter-
ests must also be established by some direct causal connection be-
tween the claimant state and the high seas activity it desires to reg-
ulate." The connection between an intervening state and a vessel
polluting from without, but causing damage within the state's
territorial sea, would appear sufficiently causal in nature.
The mere existence of a right of intervention does not automati-
cally sanction its exercise under all circumstances. Any specific
claim to exercise that right in a particular situation must be ap-
praised in its unique fact situation. This requires balancing the
claim and counterclaim in their context of reasonableness, con-
sidering all relevant factors.
The objective of the shippers is to transport oil. They have the
usual business expectations of being permitted to operate in the
world arena with a minimum of interference, burdens, and de-
mands from non-flag nations. They look to their flag state to pro-
tect them and enhance their access to markets. Flag states, too,
55. See McDOUGAL & BURKE supra note 1, at 48.
56. C. HYDE, INTERNATiONAL LAw 757 (2d ed. 1945).
have an interest in developing a prosperous shipping industry
without outside interference, but they also have an interest in
protecting their own shores from pollution by oil.
Coastal states which are potential intervenors are merely seek-
ing mitigation of a situation forced upon them. There is no at-
temp to extend soveriegnty nor to increase domestic wealth at the
expense of the shipping industry. They seek to preserve the means
of livelihood for those dependent on local sea resources, but in a
much broader sense, to preserve the resources for all who would
rightfully share them. The well-being of the wealth-producing
resources of the inhabitants of the coastal state is threatened,
whereas the threat to shippers is exclusively economic and finite.
Although the ship and cargo may be destroyed without compen-
sation from the intervening state, intervention is only permitted
when there is no other reasonable alternative. This means that
the shipper is unlikely to lose much more than he would have lost
as a result of the casualty alone because the circumstances under
which extreme measures of intervention are likely to occur would
be sufficiently grave that the vessel would probably have been lost
anyway. Therefore, the risks to the shipper would not greatly ex-
ceed his ordinary risks of loss of vessel and cargo by natural mari-
time perils. Moreover, once this risk is recognized as an integral
part of doing business, it seems that adequate protection could be
reasonably obtained through insurance.
The limitations on the polluting vessel are imposed by common
interest and are designed to maintain and restore, not to breach,
minimum order. The conditions of intervention are limited; the
safeguards extensive. The value deprivations to the shipper are
few, and are such that he is in a position to insure himself against
them. The benefits to the coastal state in preventing harm to its
interests, as well as to those of other nations, are significant. Con-
versely, in the absence of the intervention right, deprivations to
the shipper remain almost constant, while the potential damage
to life and property interests becomes almost immeasurable.57
The alternatives to denying the intervention right are few: a
state may do nothing or intervene under its own terms and theory
of justification. It seems a much more responsible approach to
acknowledge the existence of the right of a coastal state to protect
itself, thereby imposing the duty to do so with extreme caution,
and to make adequate compensation if its action is excessive. Fail-
57. For the view that the Intervention right may open a Pandora's box
of international conflicts, see Dinstein, supra note 49, at 372.
[VOL. 10: 514, 19733 High Seas Intervention
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ure to acknowledge the claim will not remove the possibility of in-
tervention since states always have acted to protect themselves.
Such failure can only encourage more desperate attempts by states
to remedy the threat, resulting in less responsible intervention,
greater detriment to shippers, and possibly undesirable sanctions
and counter-sanctions.
The claim is extremely limited. The unique circumstances un-
der which it may be exercised and the correlative duties attend-
ant thereto negate any substantial threat to freedom of naviga-
tion. Moreover, its objective assessment by the world commun-
ity protects against abuse. These factors, when considered with
the conservation of resources effected if the claim is recognized and
the extreme value deprivations if it is not, all weigh heavily for its
reasonableness and validity under international law.
V. INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS
Two significant examples of the actual practice of states in an in-
tervening role are the bombing of the Liberian tanker Torrey Can-
yon by the British government in 1967 and of the Liberain tanker
Wafra by South Africa in March 1971. Both incidents required
action in the absence of an international agreement or domestic leg-
islation, and, therefore, permit an evaluation of rights and obliga-
tions under customary international law.
A. The British Experience.-The most publicized oil spill in
which intervention has been a key issue resulted from the events
of March 18, 1967, when the Torrey Canyon5S grounded in interna-
tional waters approximately 16 miles off the coast of England and
spilled tons of oil into the sea. After 12 days of unsuccessful at-
tempts at salvage, Prime Minister Harold Wilson ordered the ship
bombed. More than 90,000 tons of oil had escaped into the sea to
pollute the British and French coasts, one of the world's largest oil
tankers lay sunken in international waters, and states pondered the
status of international law governing such action.
58. This article does not focus on the Torrey Canyon, except as it
bears on intervention. Some official reports deal with it in depth. See
COIMiITTEE OF SCIENTISTS, CABINET OFFICE, UNITE] KINGDOM, REPORT TO THE
PARLIAMENT: THE Tom=y CANYON (1967); SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE
HOME DEPT, REPORT TO THE PARLIAMENT: THE TommY CANYON, Cmnd, 3246
(Eng. 1967).
Although much has written about the incident, little focus has
been given to its significance in the development of international
law respecting the right of intervention. It provides, in fact, a
unique opportunity to scrutinize a domestic decision-making process
and the extent to which the decision-makers adhered, or failed to
adhere, to principles of international law. In this regard, the ap-
proach taken by the British government, its search for alternatives
to intervention, factors leading to the decision to bomb, and the
effects of the bombing all offer important lessons from which the
international community can profit.
Involvement by the British government was immediate. Within
two hours of the wreck a Royal Navy helicopter was surveying the
situation, by afternoon Royal Navy ships began spraying deter-
gent on the ever-growing oil slick, and the Under-Secretary of State
for Defense for the Royal Navy was placed in charge.50 Through-
out the ensuing week the Royal Navy transported salvage personnel
and equipment to the scene, provided air reconnaissance, directed
ships in spraying detergent on the floating oil, and formulated ex-
tensive plans to deal with the oil if it reached the beaches. In short,
the government undertook a comprehensive role.
Immediate pressures were placed on the government to move
cautiously. Destroying the ship and cargo would be an affront to
the private property system, to include the insurers (both Ameri-
can and British) and the salvor (a Dutch company). Moreover,
the government would risk condemnation by states if it violated
international law.
In contrast, pressures for intervention came from hotelkeepers,
lobstermen, town officials, tourists, politicians, the press-all
those to whom ecological interests were dominant.
Criticism heightened as salvage efforts made almost no pro-
gress. An editorial in the Guardian pointed out that as time passed,
the public interest might begin to weigh more heavily in the bal-
ance than the property rights of the tanker's owners.60 The Lon-
don Times chastised the government for permitting key decisions to
be made by the owners and the salvor, noting that their interests
did not coincide with the interests of the British government and
59. The British Cabinet placed Maurice Foley, Parliamentary Under
Secretary of State for Defense for the Royal Navy, in charge of the prob-
lem. Within a few hours of his assignment, Foley was advised that the
Navy recommended that the tanker and cargo be burned, as a purely tech-
nical assessment, but "Her Majesty's government could not destroy some-
one else's ship simply because it was leaking oil." CowAN, supra note 23,
at 61.
60. Id. at 62.
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people. At the risk of charges of outrage, piracy on the high seas
and an act of aggression against Libera, "the government should
have been ready to take the law into its own hands."61 Liberal
Members of Parliament charged that "the government has shown
too much regard for legality and precedent." Even Conservatives
charged: "Can anyone believe, if a British Tanker had gone aground
outside New York harbor, that President Johnson would still be
negotiating with the British owners ten days later?"' 2
Government ministers countered that minimizing pollution had
been their concern and that financial considerations and interna-
tional law had not been considered from the time the ship found-
ered. 63 At odds with this, however, was the remark of Secretary
of State for Defense, Denis Healey, that "We are not in a position to
be able to set fire to the ship until they [the ship's owners] give
their agreement that this can be done. The vessel is on the high
seas at the present time.
64
Great Britain clearly recognized the difficult legal situation. It
risked action without precedent in international law. Salvage was
the first course it necessarily had to try. The majority of tankers
stranded in the past few years had been successfully floated,65 and
experts, government and private, felt there was a reasonable
chance of getting the vessel off the rocks. While salvage efforts
61. PETROW, IN THE WAKE OF TORREw CANYON, 186 (1968).
62. Id. at 105 (comments of John Nott).
63. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP'T, REPORT TO THE PARLIAIENT:
THE TORREY CANYON, Cmnd. 3246 at 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as REPORT TO
THE PARLIAMENT).
64. Secretary Healey expressed a preference for destroying the ship,
but that such action depended on the owners. "I hope it will be de-
cided later this afternoon by the owners whether they wish to go on trying
to refloat the ship or whether they would agree that steps should be
taken to destroy it and to try to fire the oil aboard." CowAr, supra note
23, at 64.
65. Experience provided reason for supposing that the chances of salving
a stranded tanker and her cargo were good. Salvage had been success-
ful even in difficult cases. For example, the flotable fore section of the
Norwegian tanker Anne Mildred Brovig was successfully cut from the re-
mainder of the ship and salvaged with 14,000 of the original 39,000 tons of
oil aboard. However, this operation took two and one-half months and
7,500 tons of oil had to be pumped out to give the recovered section suffi-
cient buoyancy to be towed to port. CoNUnvIVTE OF SCIENTISTS, CABINET
OFIcE, UNITED KINGDOM REPORT: THE TORREY CANYON 42 (1967). [Herein-
after cited as COMMITTEE OF SCINTISTS REPORT].
were in progress, other possibilities were explored,0 6 although the
government admitted that if salvage failed, bombing was the "only
reasonable alternative left.)67
Britain did not want to destroy a foreign vessel without the own-
er's consent, and Union Oil would only consent if it were paid for
the ship. Allowing for the ship's condition, it was still worth $10
million. The Cabinet declined to buy the tanker, but did begin
making arrangements to buy out the salvor if the ship were re-
floated so that it would have complete and immediate control over
her disposal.68
An alternative to buying the tanker was to exclude it from Bri-
tish waters and Prime Minister Wilson announced that the govern-
ment reserved the right to refuse entry for the ship into British ter-
ritorial waters.6 9 This doubtlessly posed substantial obstacles to
effective salvage even if the remaining sections of the ship could
be refloated and towed to a port.70
On Easter afternoon the major salvage attempt failed. The hull
tore apart, opened formerly unruptured cargo tanks and pured
more oil into the sea. Still, the salvor continued salvage efforts un-
til Tuesday morning when he formally withdrew with the consent
of Union Oil.
In London on Monday night government ministers decided that
"all hope of minimizing pollution through towing away the ship, or
any part of her, must be abandoned. 71 " The Royal Navy was then
ordered to set fire to the remaining oil.
7 2
66. The oil might have been contained by placing a boom around the
ship. A boom was constructed, but not in time. Immobilizing the oil by
gelling, freezing or mechanical means was impracticable. The transfer of
the remaining oil to another tanker was not feasible. Burning the oil in
situ required calm weather; moreover, boarding the ship to emplace dem-
olitions and destroying the ship to get to the oil was extremely hazardous.
When the vessel broke apart and weather worsened, burning was rejected.
Salvage continued to be the most desirable alternative. For a discussion
of the alternative considered, see CouIav or Scimzsrs REPORT, supra
note 65, at 13. The appraisal of the hazards posed was not without
foundation. On March 22 a terrific explosion occurred in the engine
room. A number of men on deck were injured, two were blown over-
board, and the salvage captain was killed. See CowAr, supra note 23,
at 72, 80.
67. ComnavTrr OF SciENnsTs REPORT, supra note 65 at 18.
68. COMMITTEE OF SCIENTIsTs REPORT, supra note 65 at 14.
69. CowAN, supra note 23, at 93; REPORT TO PARLL&mNT, supra note 63,
at 4.
70. For comments of the Dutch Foreign Ministry in reply to Britain's
announcement, see CowAN, supra note 23, at 88.
71. REPORT TO PARfAMENT, supra note 63, at 3.
72. At. 9:00 A.M. Tuesday, March 28, the Commander in Chief of Naval
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That Great Britain intended to intervene at this point is certain,
but there is uncertainty as to the exact sequence of events which
followed. According to Home Secretary Jenkins, "The owners and
insurers were told of the government's decision to bomb the ship
Tuesday morning. We did not ask them; we told them.' 73 It is
not clear whether the owners and insurers were told before or af-
ter they had themselves abandoned the ship, but the actual order
to bomb was not given until hours after they had abandoned sal-
vage efforts. This raises the unique question of whether the act of
destroying a derelict constitutes intervention7 4
A separate consideration from the actual decision to bomb is the
effects of the bombing itself. In deciding to bomb, the government
took the position that no less destructive means was reasonable.
If, however, excessive force was employed, it thereby subjected the
government to responsibility for disproportionate damages inflicted.
Such might also remove much of the liability of the owners for
pollution damage because of the difficulty in proving whether or
Forces, Plymouth, drafted a message to the Commander of the Royal
Naval Air Station at Lossiemouth, in Northern Scotland: "Question: Let
me have your suggestions on how you would rupture oil compartments
and ignite contents of Torrey Canyon." Forty-five minutes later, Loissie-
mouth replied: "Answer: Bombing with 1,000 pound Medium Capacity
High Explosive bombs attacking from side to which ship is listing to
achieve penetration without ricochets." CoWAx, supra note 23 at 106.
73. Id.
74. A vessel which has been abandoned by her master and crew is a
"derelict" but this by no means is the same thing as saying she
does not still belong to her Owners. When the British bombed
the TORREY CANYON she was a "derelict", as she had been
abandoned by her master and crew, but I do not know whether
or not the Owners had agreed to the bombing.
Letter from Nicholas J. Healy to R. Palmer Cundick, Apr. 16, 1971. Mr.
Healy represented the British Petroleum interests, as owners of the cargo
lost as a result of the Torrey Canyon stranding, in the limitation of lia-
bility proceedings in the U.S. District Court. After settlement was made
with England and France, the British Petroleum claim was withdrawn.
See in 'e Barracuda, 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 409 F.2d 1013 (2d
Cir. 1969). In practical terms, the coastal state is faced with a continuing
threat from a derelict over which the owners are unable to exrcise con-
trol. Having thus abandoned a dangerous and uncontrollable instru-
mentality, do they retain the right to object to necessary measures by the
coastal state to abate the danger posed? Whereas abandonment of salvage
normally does not constitute abandonment of ownership, it may well con-
stitute a waiver of the right to object to disposition of the vessel until the
threat is abated. In such circumstances, the legal effect of destruction may
be something less than intervention.
not the intervening action mitigated or increased such damage.
The bombing may have been too late to have significantly abated
the pollution. Independent scientists and tanker men argue that
little oil remained in the tanker and that part of this survived the
flames to add to the pollution of the Cornish coast. The govern-
ment maintains that there was substantial oil in the tanker, most of
which was destroyed by the bombing.
When faced with liability for pollution damages, the Barracuda
Tanker Corporation, a subsidiary of Union Oil and legal owner of
the Torrey Canyon, asserted the bombing as a defense and said that
the bombing itself was primarily responsible for the pollution.
Moreover, it challenged Britiain's right to bomb the tanker while
it lay in international waters, calling the bombing "a trespass. ' 7
Whatever the merits of the contentions, insurance proceeds per-
mitted settlement short of litigation and removed resolution of
these issues from the courts. 6
It is the opinion of this writer that when, under similar condi-
tions, there is a reasonable difference of opinion as to the propor-
tionality of response, resolution should be in favor of upholding the
coastal state action. Responsible decision-making must encour-
age the exhaustion of alternatives short of destruction. Every day
that such alternatives are unsuccessfully tried, the effective-
ness in destroying oil by bombing is lessened. If Great Britain had
resorted to bombing the first day of the grounding, only a small
amount of oil might have escaped, but little can be said in defense
of such action as being consistent with international law. It is far
better to encourage a coastal state to seek responsible alternatives,
and then, if they fail and if bombing is not clearly a disproportion-
ate measure, to resolve doubts in its favor.
British experience permits some observations concerning the
decision-making process. First, the government named a respon-
sible official to act in its behalf and authorized him to utilize avail-
able national resources to solve the problem. This assured not only
75. A private landowner wrote to the Barracuda Tanker Corporation
informing them of his intent to seek damages. Barracuda's Bermudan
lawyers repied: "We have been instructed to deny any responsibility for
this damage, either past, present, or future, for even if it can be substan-
tiated that the oil came from the Torrey Canyon the majority of the oil
was released by the bombing of the ship by the British government with-
out the consent or connivance of the owners." Pamow, supra note 61,
at 232.
76. The settlement on the Torrey Canyon was made promptly. On
April 10, 1967, American Hull Insurance Syndicate paid Union Oil Com-
pany of California $8,250,000. Two days later Lloyds made payment in
the amount of $6,600,000.
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that maximum efforts would be made to abate the pollution, but
provided a source of first-hand facts on which he could act. Second,
the official consulted with leading scientists, Admiralty experts,
and other advisors to examine reasonable alternatives. Third, every
effort was made to preserve life, to respect private property
rights, and to conserve material resources-in short, to resolve the
conflict without resorting to unilateral governmental action.
Fourth, the decision to act unilaterally was made only after other
alternatives were no longer feasible. Finally, despite the avow-
als of some British leaders that national interests were their first
consideration, there was a de facto respect for law demonstrated.
Clearly, intervention was permissible under the circumstances. 77
B. The South African Experience.-The Liberian tanker Wafra
ran aground on February 28, 1971, on a reef 6 miles off Africa's
southernmost tip. After leaking oil for a week and starting wide-
spread pollution, the $12 million ship was freed from the reef, towed
200 miles out to sea, and destroyed by the South African Air
Force.78
South Africa's approach is instructive and significantly different
from Great Britain. Immediately after the grounding, experts con-
cluded that unless the vessel could be pulled free, the only solution
to a major oil pollution threat would be the complete destruction
of the vessel. This opinion was endorsed by representatives of the
ship's owners, but the decision left to the South African govern-
ment.79
Salvage efforts were begun, but made little progress. Oil con-
77. The emergency which the Torrey Canyon precipitated was, ar-
guably, from the point of view of the coastal state, one where
[under the doctrine of the Caroline case] "the necessity of that
self-defence is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation." A case, surely, could
have been made for a swift abating action on the part of the Brit-
ish Government, provided it did not involve risking the lives of
the stricken vessel's officers and crew.
Goldie, Book Review, 1 J. MA. L. & CoM. 155, 158 (1969). For the Caroline
case, see Jennings, The Caroline and MeLeod Cases, 32 Am. J. INT'L L.
82, 92 (1938).
78. Johannesburg Star (S. Africa), Mar. 1, 1971, at 1, col. 1; Wash. Post,
Mar. 12, 1971, § C, at 6, col. 3. For details of the Wafra incidet, see R.
Cundick, Oil Pollution: Negotiation-An Alternative to Intervention?
6 INT'L LAWYER 34 (1972).
79. Johannesburg Star (S. Africa), Mar. 1, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
tinued to pour out into the sea. The question of intervention was
unavoidable. Government officials met with anti-pollution sur-
veyors, oil, salvage and insurance companies and decided that it
would be best to tow the tanker as far away as possible as fast as
possible. But someone had to bear the costs. On this issue the gov-
ernment and the owners began negotiations.
It was in the interest of the government to remove the ship, even
if it subsequently became necessary to destroy it. If the ship could
be salvaged in the process of removing it from the reef, this was
also in the interests of the owners. Unlike the Torrey Canyon, no
salvage company would take the job on a "no cure-no pay" basis.80
A contract guaranteeing a fixed remuneration not contingent on
success was demanded by the salvor.
The government agreed to hire a salvor to pursue salvage efforts
for 10 days. If salvage were successful, the ship and cargo would
be retained by the owners. If not, the vessel would be destroyed,
at sea if possible. In turn, the owners of the cargo and vessel
agreed to grant indemnity to the government, promising that what-
ever was done with the ship, they would not institute actions for
damages or compensation.8 1
On March 9, the tanker was freed from the reef, but was beyond
effective salvage. It was then towed 200 miles on the high seas,
bombed and sunk.8 2
The single most important contribution which the Wafra disaster
has disclosed is another alternative to intervention: a coastal state
and the owners of the vessel and cargo realistically negotiating
their differences. While this approach requires a state to expend
some of its resources to reach a compromise position, it is doubtful
that such costs, at least in a comparable situation, are dispropor-
tionate to the benefits received, especially in averting damage to
coastal interests incurred while there is indecision, or in averting
expenses which a state might incur if it subsequently became in-
volved in extensive litigation to resolve these very issues. More-
over, the approach provided a particularly appropriate solution in
view of some of the potential questions which it mooted: (1)
whether the vessel was in territorial waters or on the high seas
80. The salvage contract in the Torrey Canyon was the usual "no cure-
no pay" agreement in which the salvor is successful in obtaining re-
muneration only if he is successful in salving the ship. Success is a con-
dition precedent to remuneration.
81. Johannesburg Star (S. Africa), Mar. 6, 1971, at 1, col. 8.
82. Information provided the writer by Reuters Limited, 615 National
Press Building, Wash., D.C. 20004 on Mar. 23, 1971.
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(South Africa claims a 6-mile terriorial sea);83 (2) whether the
facts warranted intervention; and (3) whether the towing of a ship
200 miles on the high seas and sinking it is within the lawful scope
of the intervention right.
In the light of this experience, negotiation is a realistic alterna-
five. It has considerable practical appeal because it apportions some
of the loss. Moreover, if a state's offer to negotiate is refused, or a
reasonable compromise cannot be reached, its claim to intervene
is considerably enhanced.
VI. STATUMORY CLAIMS
Now that we have considered the characteristics of the right of
intervention as a customary right, we may test particular claims of
states to intervene. Since Canada, the United States, and Great
Britain have enacted legislation which does not purport to be treaty-
implementing, their respective claims merit particular attention.
A. Canadian Claim.-In 1970 the Canadian Parliament took ac-
tion on three bills having a bearing upon intervention, the Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act (hereinafter, Arctic Waters Act) ,84
An Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act (here-
inafter Territorial Sea Act),85 and An Act to Amend the Canada
Shipping Act (hereinafter, Canada Shipping Act).86
These Acts are comprehensive. Attention is herein limited, how-
ever, to those portions dealing with intervention, except as it is
83. Article 2, Territorial Waters Act 1963, Government Gazette Extra-
ordinary No. 87, July 12, 1963, at 2.
84. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, supra note 13. Sources of
the legislative history may be found in Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69 IcH. L.
REV. 1 (1970).
85. An Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, supra
note 14. The legislation seeks to extend the territorial sea from 3 to 12
miles and to establish exclusive Canadian fisheries zones in areas of the
high seas beyond 12 miles.
86. An Act to Amend the Canada Shipping Act, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c. 35(Can. 1970). The Act permits regulation of oil pollution by ships in
Canadian waters south of the 60th parallel, all Canadian waters north of
the 60th parallel that are not within a shipping safety control zone pre-
scribed pursuant to the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, and to
any fishing zone prescribed pursuant to the Territorial Sea and Fishing
Zones Act.
necessary to examine other portions which clarify the claim, or
which cannot be reasonably separated from it.
Concerning intervention, the Arctic Waters Act provides that:
13(1) Where the Governor in Council has reasonable cause to be-
lieve that a ship that is within the actic waters and is in dis-
tress, stranded, wrecked, sunk or abandoned, is depositing
waste or is likely to deposit waste in the arctic waters, he
may cause the ship or any cargo or other material on board
the ship to be destroyed, if necessary or to be removed if
possible to such place and sold in such manner as he may
direct.
The Act applies to all ships, public or private, which are in arctic
waters. The definition of "waste" is comprehensive and would
include oil. "Arctic waters" include waters in both a liquid and
frozen state within specified geographical designations.
The Canadian Shipping Act asserts a similar authority to inter-
vene in all Canadian waters not within shipping zones under the
Arctic Waters Act, including the newly claimed 12-mile territorial
sea, claimed by the Territorial Sea Act, and any fishing zones out-
side those territorial waters prescribed pursuant to that Act.
Underlying these statutes is the Canadian argument that the arc-
tic ecology is peculiar, that life there exists under extremely se-
vere conditions, and that any major oil spill in the Arctic Ocean
might have disastrous and irreversiable ecological consequences.
Nevertheless, these special circumstances should not be the pre-
dominant factor insofar as the right of intervention is concerned.
Clearly, if they were the predominant justification, the claim to
intervene in non-arctic waters, also asserted by Canada, must fail.
Rather, they should be only one of many factors to balance in ap-
praising the claim.
Conceivably, the unique arctic environment and the propensity
for disproportionate damages in event of an oil spill might substan-
tially reduce the availability of other reasonable alternatives and
tip the balance in favor of intervention where such intervention
might not be justified in non-arctic waters. But such justification
must result from the balancing process, not in lieu of it.
Canada has expressed that in environmental matters it is not pre-
pared to await the gradual development of international law, nei-
ther by other states through their practice nor through the possi-
ble development of rules of law through multilateral treaties.87
87. Remarks of Prime Minister Trudeau on the proposed legislation
made April 8, 1970, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT sALs, 602 (1970).
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In the Canadian view the international law that now stands does
not sufficiently protect countries on the pollution aspect of inter-
national waters. Moreover, traditional principles of international
law concerning pollution of the sea are based mainly on ensuring
freedom of navigation to maritime states. "Such traditional con-
cepts are of little or no relevance anywhere in the world if they
can be cited as precluding action by a coastal state to protect this
environment."8 8 Consistent with this view, Canada objected to, and
abstained from voting on, the Intervention Convention on the
grounds that it failed to permit sufficient prior control to prevent
accidents from occurring.
This position reflects the vigor and candor with which the Cana-
dian claims are being pursued, but not the merits of those claims.
The proposition that there are legitimate interests to be protected
and that convention international law has been slow to develop is
substantially correct. However, the proposition that interna-
tional law does not sufficiently protect countries from pollution
arising in international waters is not persuasive, particularly since
customary international law has always recognized the right of a
state to protect itself from harm. In fact, Canada relies on the ex-
istence of such fundamental principles because it bases its claim on
the right of self-defense, considering that "a danger to the envi-
ronment of a state constitutes a threat to its securiy."'8 9
To determine the reasonableness of a particular claim there must
be (1) an authoritative decision-maker, and (2) a decision by ob-
jective criteria. Immediate conflict was created with the first re-
quirement when Canada announced, concurrently with its overall
environmental claim, the withdrawal of its consent to compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ in any matters pertaining to
disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed
or exercised by Canada in respect to the conservation, management
or exploitation of the living resources of the sea, or in respect of
prevention or control of pollution or contamination of the marine
environment in marine areas adjacent to the coast of Canada. 90
88. Canadian Reply to the United States Government (Apr. 16, 1970) as
summarized in 9 INT'L LEGAL MA&rERLls 607, 610 (1970).
89. Id. at 608.
90. Canadian Declaration Concerning the Compulsory Jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice, Apr. 7, 1970, reproduced from U.N.
Communication C.N. 53. 1970 Treaties-3 of Apr. 21, 1970, in 9 INu'L LEGAL
MATE us, 598 (1970). Any American criticism of the Canadian with-
By this means, Canada sought to free its claims from any binding
international evaluation. But whereas it removed consideration of
the claims from the formal decision-making process as imple-
mented by the ICJ, it did not effect removal of the claims from the
decision-making process. It merely removed decision one step
back to the world community itself, which is itself an authoritative
decision-maker. All that has been accomplished is that Canada's
motives and objectives are under closer scrutiny and are subject
to more severe criticism, which does little to enhance the claim.
The heart of the difficulty with the Canadia claim lies in the sec-
ond requirement of decision by objective criteria. Whatever basic
principle of law be applied, whether it is self-defense or something
else, there must be some standards by which to apply it. Nowhere
in the legislation is there any requirement specifying the magni-
tude of the danger of pollution required before intervention is jus-
tified. The discharge of oil may be enormous, of catastrophic pro-
portions; it may be very minor. All that is required is that the ves-
sel deposit a pollutant into waters within the prohibited zones. Fur-
ther, there is no attempt to define the magnitude of the conse-
quences of the danger which must threaten Canada. The legislation
does specify that the vessel must be "removed if possible" as op-
posed to being "destroyed,"91 but this is a mandate as to the de-
gree of intervention, not to whether intervention is even justified
under a particular situation.
Without some reasonably objective qualification at least as to
the degree of danger which must be threatened before interven-
tion may be effected, the burden on any domestic decision-maker
to enforce the claim is onerous. The criteria of whether to inter-
vene is totally discretionary, too vague, too broad, and cannot be
sanctioned under international law.92
B. United States Claim.-In 1969 and 1970 the United States
passed major legislation dealing with environmental problems. The
drawal of jurisdiction could, in the Canadian view, only be regarded as
highly hypocritical in view of the United States' own much broader
"Connally Reservation." The vulnerability of the United States to these
arguments serves to illustrate the reciprocal effects of national decisions
in the international arena. A state is in no position to complain if another
state imitates its actions. See 114 H.C. Deb. 5949 (Apr. 16, 1970) and Id.
at 5945 (remarks of Mr. Douglas), cited in Bilder, supra note 84, at 28 n.19.
91. Sections 736 (j) & 738(i), An Act to Amend the Canada Shipping Act,
supra note 86; Sections 2(h) & 13(1), Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act, supra note 13.
92. The Canadian claim is not enhanced by the failure of its delegation
to sign the Intervention Convention because, in its view, it fell short of
effective protection for coastal states.
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principal legislation regulating pollution of water by oil and other
hazardous substances is the Water Quality Improvement Act of
1970 (WQIA). Section 11 regulates the control of pollution by oil.
The claim to intervene is set forth in subsection (d) as follows:
Whenever a marine disaster in or upon the navigable waters of the
United States has created a substantial threat of a pollution hazard
to the public health or welfare of the United States, including, but
not limited to, fish, shellfish, and wildlife and the public and private
shorelines and beaches of the United States, because of a discharge
of oil from a vessel the United States may (A) coordinate and di-
rect all public and private efforts directed at the removal or elim-
ination of such threat; and (B) summarily remove, and, if neces-
sary, destroy such vessel by whatever means are available with-
out regard to any provision of law governing the employment of
personnel or the expenditure of appropriated funds (emphasis
added).
Authority claimed by the United States to remove or destroy a
vessel follows closely the philosophy and language of the same au-
thority vested in the Secretary of the Army by the River and Har-
bor Act of 1899 in situations where a vessel constitutes a threat
to navigation.9 3 That act empowers the government to take
immediate possession of a vessel and to remove or destroy it where,
under an emergency, the vessel stops, seriously interferes with or
specifically endangers navigation.
In passing the WQIA Congress carefully limited the authority it
granted: although it proscribed discharges of oil even in the con-
tiguous zone, it restricted the power to intervene to navigable wa-
ters. Nowhere is there even any hint that the statutory power to
intervene was intended to apply outside territorial waters.94 A
House bill entitled the Tanker Disaster Act of 1969, had it been
enacted, would have given the President comprehensive authority
to remove the threat of pollutants of any kind, including the
power to destroy a vessel within or without territorial waters.
95
93. 33 U.S.C. 415, For the Legislative history, see U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 811 (1970).
94. It is surprising that the scope is so narrow because the River and
Harbor Act of 1899 already authorizes the United States to take immediate
possession of any vessel so far as to remove or to destroy it to clear
navigable waters. Thus, it is difficult to find any substantive authority
which has been added by the WQIA to the power to intervene since it is
limited to territorial waters and the authority to act there is already
existant.
95. The bill died in the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.
This bill more closely paralleled the Canadian legislation, but was
never reported out of committee.
Consistent with the Congressional intent to confine the claim are
the implementing regulations by the executive branch which nar-
rowly define "navigable waters of the United States" for purposes
of Section 11(p) (1) as including only "the coastal territorial waters
of the United States, the inland waters of the United States including
the United States portion of the Great Lakes and the Saint Lawrence
Seaway, and the Panama Canal."90,
Like the Canadian claim, the United States claim is also part of a
much broader legislative anti-pollution program. In sharp con-
trast, however, there is no concurrent provision for extension of the
United States territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles, nor for the estab-
lishment of extremely broad pollution control zones, such as the
100-mile Canadian arctic zone. Moreover, so narrow are the ob-
jectives of the U.S. claim that even though it is only authorized in
territoral waters, it is still the intent of Congress that "every pre-
caution be exercised in the use of this authority; 7" even then it
should only be used when the pollution threat is substantial and
the danger imminent. For this reason, the claim can hardly be
construed as seeking more than the protection of coastal interests
through limited intervention under unique circumstances.
In view of the strong determination of Congress to provide ad-
equate means of dealing with massive oil spill problems, it is
surprising that no proscription is applied to the high seas; especially
since it is within the contiguous zone that the United States claims
competence to regulate oil pollution for practically all other pur-
poses besides intervention.
A possible explanation of the narrowness of the claim is that the
United States anti-pollution approach to non-territorial coastal
waters within the contiguous zone appears to be based on the power
Its pertinent parts provide:
Whenever, as a result of marine disaster within or without the
territorial waters of the United States, an ocean-going vessel
shall release substantial quantities of fluids or other substances,
which may tend to contaminate the oceans or the shoreline or the
atmosphere,... [the President] shall have the power to take
such steps as he may deem necessary, within or without terri-
torial waters of the United States, including the destruction of the
offending vessel and its cargo (emphasis added). H.R. 6218, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
96. Federal Maritime Commission rules and regulations governing ship-
ping, 35 Fed. Reg. 15216, 15220 (1970).
97. Senate Comm. on Public Works, Report on Amending the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, as Amended, and for Other Purposes, to
Accompany S-7, Sen. Doc. No. 91-351, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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under the 1958 Convention to prescribe sanitary regulations where
the public health and welfare are affected, as opposed to an inde-
pendent basis such as self-protection. On such a theory it is tenu-
ous to argue that the extraordinary right of intervention is within
the purview of contemplated regulation authorized by that Conven-
ion.
The decision of Congress to limit the claim places the United
States in a rather vulnerable position because more than half of the
major oil spills from tanker disasters during the past half decade
have occurred beyond three miles from a nation's coastlines. Thus,
it has no statutory authority to intervene beyond its 3-mile terri-
torial sea nor to intervene to protect against hazardous substances
other than oil even within its territorial waters, unless the latter
power is derived from the River and Harbor Act.
Perhaps the Congressional intent was to fill this gap, at least as
to oil pollution, by subsequent legislation to implement the Inter-
vention Convention. Another possibility might have been the ex-
pectation that there would be international consensus on a 12-mile
territorial sea in the forthcoming Law of the Sea Conference, which
would automatically extend the statutory intervention power
limited to the territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles. Whatever the Con-
gressional intent, the result is that the United States has a lawful
but perhaps ineffective claim until the Intervention Convention
comes into force concurrent with implementing legislation, or
until a multilateral forum agrees upon a wider territorial sea than
three miles. The statutory claim does not, of course, prevent the
United States from exercising its customary international law
right to intervene.
C. The British Claim.-The British legislation is most forthright
in providing guidance to the decision-maker. The Parliament first
authorized intervention outside territorial waters only if Her Maj-
esty by Order in Council so provided. An Order was then published
with the announcement that it merely gave statutory backing to
action taken by the government in relation to foreign vessels out-
side its territorial waters and to make clear in domestic law the
government's right to take such action.98 Shortly thereafter, the
98. Dep't of Trade and Industry Press Notice, "New Order Clarifies
Government's Powers in Fight Against Oil Pollution", Nov. 2, 1971 (Eng.).
Oil in Navigable Waters Act 1971, which authorized the Order, was
repealed and consolidated by the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act
1971. 99 The repealing Act, in identical fashion, also permits exten-
sion of the intervention powers, which, under the Act's savings
clause, continue in force as previously authorized by the Order.
When the intervention powers were initially extended to the
high seas, the government noted that adequate powers were avail-
able to it under international law and that the Intervention Con-
vention which it had ratified (not yet in force) merely gave such
powers formal expression. 00 Moreover, the Parliament declared
in both Acts that they were without prejudice to any rights or pow-
ers which the United Kingdom might exercise under international
law.
The intervention provisions of both Acts are substantially the
same. Action is permitted where emergency powers are urgently
needed to prevent or reduce large scale oil pollution. Before tak-
ing any action the government is required to seek the best profes-
sional advice and to act in the fullest consultation with those hav-
ing an interest in the ship or its cargo. The powers are to be in-
voked "only in the last resort after all reasonable attempts to deal
with the situation by persuasion and consultation have failed."'' °
Conjointly with asserting its rights, the government accepts respon-
sibility for damages if statutory guidance is exceeded.' 0 2
Once intervention is contemplated the government must first
consider directing the owners, master or salvor in charge of the
99. See note 17, supra.
100. See note 98, supra.
101. Id. See also Section 12(4) of the Prevention of Oil Pollution Act
1971.
102. Section 13 of the Prevention of Oil Protection Act 1971, c.21 (Eng.)
provides:
(1) If any action duly taken by a person in pursuance of a
direction given to him under section 12 of this Act or any action
taken under subsection (4) or (5) of that section-(a) was not reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce oil pol-
lution, or risk of oil pollution; or(b) was such that the good it did or was likely to do was dis-
proportionately less than the expense incurred, or damage suf-
fered, as a result of the action,
a person incurring expense or suffering damage as a result of, or
by himself taking, the action shall be entitled to recover compen-
sation from the Secretary of State.
(2) In considering whether subsection (1) of this section applies,
account shall be taken of-(a) the extent and risk of oil pollution if the action had not
been taken;(b) the likelihood of the action being effective; and
(c) the extent of the damage which has been caused by the
action.
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ship to take a particular course of action, such as moving the ship,
discharging or unloading oil or other cargo, or taking particular
salvage measures. If that does not abate the threat, the govern-
ment may take control of the ship and destroy it if necessary.103
The British intervention legislation reflects a comprehensive
understanding of international law and should seriously be con-
sidered by other states as a worthy model.
VII. INTERNATIONAL OCEAS POLICY
A meaningful appraisal of the claim to intervene must consider
not only the immediate stresses which it creates on the legal regime
of the high seas, and an acceptable easing of those stresses, but also
the long-range impact which its approval or disapproval will have
on that regime. Essentially, the appraisal must be policy-oriented,
considering the extent to which an optimum oceans policy should
permit accommodation or new uses, the limitation on unilateral ac-
tion, and the reciprocal sanctions it anticipates if unilateral ac-
tion is excessive.
The need has never been greater for a regime of the high seas
which can, with minimum conflict, accomodate continuously emerg-
ing claims while maintaining that balance providing the greatest
possible access to the oceans by all ships, allowing them the
greatest freedom of movement compatible with the essential pro-
tection of exclusive coastal interests.
A. Amenability to New Uses.-An opitmum oceans policy must
be amenable to positive changes, taking into account past expec-
tations, but must also seek a net gain in deciding whether a new
competing use is to be accomodated. Any departure from tradi-
tional rules must only be in those exceptional cases which are
themselves in the best interest of the international community.
Where there is a demonstrable need for the law of the sea to ac-
comodate special interests of coastal states, maritime states must
recognize that established law (as opposed to principles of law)
may not give sufficient recognition to these interests. Concerning
pollution, for example, it is both practical and equitable for coastal
states to have some control over hazardous shipping activity adja-
103. Id. § 12(4).
cent to their coasts. A policy which refuses to accomodate these
coastal interests will unlikely diminish efforts by states to exer-
cise such control. Moreover, it may result in unreasonable claims
if states become dissatisfied with the role and function of inter-
national law as a viable system to resolve contemporary prob-
lems.
The heart of the controversy is to find a meaningful solution
which will make the system work when it is challenged by a new
use. In the intervention situation the use of the oceans to trans-
port oil competes with the enjoyment of coastal waters free from
pollution by oil. If continued shipments of oil are deemed bene-
ficial, perhaps the price of those shipments is recognition of the
competence of the coastal state to intervene when pollution is
threatened. That accomodation does not add unreasonable bur-
dens to the shipping industry and still permits vessels to operate
in productive oceans commerce. If, on the other hand, the alter-
native is to exclude vessels from certain ports or territorial waters,
or to permit them to pollute, the result contributes little.
B. Resistivity to Unreasonable Claims.--The trend internation-
ally is from the protection of exclusive uses by a few states toward
protection of common uses of the community of states. Unfor-
tunately, some states have recognized that trend and have at-
tempted to counteract it by making unreasonable unilateral claims
which frustrate efforts to balance the equities and to develop in-
ternationally agreed rules under which they may protect their
legitimate coastal interests. Such actions undermine established
law and are especially damaging when the claimants assert that
they may act unilaterally if they judge existing law to be invalid or
inadequate. Such states must recognize that competing interests
need not be irreconcilable. Moreover, there must be a genuine at-
tempt at reconciliation and a distinction in practice between the
right of sovereignty over a particular area or activity, and the
right to exercise a merely protective jurisdiction over it when
it is outside the national domain. A contrary approach will ulti-
mately injure those states as they develop and find a need for a
greater participation in the world community. The propensity
for abuse through the unilateral approach is great; the result is
often little more than a setback for the international legal pro-
cess.
There is, of course, a legitimate right of unilateral action under
certain circumstances. A claimant state must, however, be able
to demonstrate a need for it in terms of some recognized princi-
ple of international law, as well as an ability to satisfy effec-
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tively that need by means of the claim. In the absence of some
agreement to the contrary, its validity should not be measured in
terms of the number of miles from the coast at which it is asserted,
but in terms of the functional relationship between the authority
claimed and the exclusive interest allegedly requiring protection,
and by how effectively those interests are protected by that particu-
lar claim. The naked assertion of a claim without its providing a ra-
tional means of satisfying a particular recognized need starts the
departure from international law and resistance by the world com-
munity to its accomodation.
Unilateral claims face yet another difficulty in acceptance be-
cause of the multitude of international organizations and processes
through which change may be effected multilaterally. The con-
vention route is one means of obtaining the widest possible ac-
ceptance for a particular use. Given the opportunity to work
through international channels, a state, having elected not to do
so, considerably jeopardizes recognition of any unilateral claim.
C. Reciprocity as a Stablizier.-Establishment of prudent na-
tional and international goals for use of the oceans requires con-
sideration of the contemporary practice of states as it has evolved
through a pattern of mutual claim and reciprocal tolerance. There
has always been considerable give and take. The intervention
claim, as worked out in practice in both the Torrey Canyon and
Wafra experiences, is illustrative of how all interests had to make
de facto accomodations. The shipping interests, the insurers, the
flag state and the coastal states all sustained a net loss in time and
resources expended. Yet, coastal states did not generally con-
demn the action taken by either Great Britain or South Africa for
they recognized their own vulnerability to a similar situation. This
was further evidenced by the comparatively little resistance
voiced to the Intervention Convention.
Reciprocity is important even to major powers. The Soviet
Union, for example, has shown concern, not that its vessels might
be subject to intervention, but that the intervening state might not
abide by the principle of proportionality, and the attendant duties
in event of its violation, to which the Soviet Union impliedly sub-
scribes. At the Intervention Convention the Russian delegate ex-
pressed that the Soviet Union owned a very large tanker fleet
which sailed over the seas of the entire world, and it
was permanently conscious that one of its ships might one day
cause an accident; it was obvious that in such a case it hoped that
the coastal state which was obliged to take measures [by way of
intervention] to prevent pollution would not take excessive mea-
sures liable to cause the Soviet fleet any damage which would not
give rise to compensation.104
The mutual restraint by nations in asserting claims is probably
the best evidence of how effectively the principle of reciprocity
operates. Nevertheless, abuses occur. What one country can do,
another can do also-and perhaps to a greater degree. When a state
acts unilaterally, other nations, while not necessarily taking iden-
tical action, can be expected to copy the basis of the action taken.
If the basis is improper or too loosely defined, the snowball
effect is difficult to halt.
VIII. RECOMENDATIONS
In the charting policy for future regulation of activities of the
oceans, there is opportunity to make law responsive to community
needs without unreasonably jeopardizing recognized common
uses. As to intervention, clearly, an unrestrained, unqualified
right, whether on the high seas or in territorial waters, is not de-
sirable or even lawful. Conversely, the case for denying interven-
tion under any circumstances increasingly weakens as man real-
izes that the vast oceans do have an exhaustion point to their assim-
ilative capacity for pollutants.
Experience with massive oil spills have not been without some
positive effects. Claimants to the right of intervention have
created an awareness of the need for such a right and for a respon-
sible criteria for its exercise, especially through the Intervention
Convention. Efforts are being made world-wide to develop safe-
guards to reduce the probability of maritime disasters and thus
the situations in which intervention might be necessary. Improved
methods of cleaning up oil spills have been developed.
The lawyer can play a major role in developing the law of the
sea in this area if he will:
(1) Emphasize the duties and responsibilities of intervention
rather than debate the right. The problem is not in recognzing the
right; it is in preventing its abuse. States must understand their
duty to make diligent inquiry into all the facts and circumstances,
to consider all reasonable alternatives, and then, if intervention
is justified, to use only that degree of force necessary (and to
compensate if excessive force is used).
104. IMCO Doc. LEG/CONF/C.1/SR.19 at 15 (Nov. 24, 1969).
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(2) Educate states as to the extremely limited application of
the claim-the unusual circumstances in which it would be justi-
fied--especially by distinguishing the existence of the right from
its lawful exercise under very unique circumstances.
(3) Encourage states, where appropriate, to seek a negotiated
compromise with the owners of the polluting vessel and its cargo
whereby they may remove or destroy the vessel with the owners'
consent if other alternatives fail. Even though this compromise
may result in payment by states of part or all of the salvage costs
or some other allocation of expenses, states may still find such an
arrangement to their advantage. This approach avoids the neces-
sity of intervention and the problems it presents.
(4) Emphasize the sharing of technology for preventing or
cleaning up oil spills. Development of effective, harmless clean-
ing methods might produce a more reasonable alternative than
intervention.
(5) Encourage the establishment of safer shipping laws and
navigational aids. This will not eliminate tanker disasters, but
should significantly reduce them.10 5 Reducing the propensity for
disasters and the harm should one occur can only minimize the
need to intervene.
(6) Educate states to the customary international law principle
of reasonableness. A policy which measures each danger of pollu-
tion on its facts in context, weighing the benefits against the
risks and looking closely at other alternatives to intervention, is
more realistic than one which prohibits any intervention under
any circumstances. The reasonableness criterion has the merit of
adapting to change as new and better methods are developed.
Moreover, solutions which might have been reasonable only a few
years ago may be rejected as no longer reasonable. In this man-
ner it permits adaptability to new conditions rather than being tied
unyieldingly to the past. This assumes, of course, that there will
be diligence in research for improved methods of handling the
problem. Moreover, once any nation develops the technology to
abate a particular pollutant effectively and makes it available to
105. B. Legg, Fairways Regulations: Jurisdiction and Effect, 26 JAG
JoURNAL 205 (1972).
the international community, the criterion of reasonableness must
take such technology into account.
We may anticipate situations of potentially graver consequences
as new and more extensive uses are made of our oceans. The need
for flexibility will become even greater if coercion and conflict
are to be minimized. International law must assume a positive
stabilizing role and effect a workable regime in which the com-
plex activities of the world community can be accomodated and
encouraged without threat of violence and disruption. Nations
asserting unilateral claims must recognize that the world com-
munity will subject them to careful scrutiny and analysis. If their
claims can withstand such scrutiny, they will find their lawful
place. If not, they must be rejected as inimical to a proved world
ocean policy which allocates international resources for the bene-
fit and shared use of all nations.
